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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
QUAYLC CANNON, JR.; and SHELDON R. 
BRBllSTER, on b~half. of themselves 
and other parties s1m1larly situated, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
LEONARD w. Mc DONALD I in his original 
capacity as Executive Director of the 
Utah State Retirement Board, and the 
utah State Retirement Board, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16586 
This is an action requiring defendants to grant 
le~islative pensions to plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court granted judgment to the plaintiffs awarding 
them a legislative pension based upon the stipulated facts and 
the state's retirement laws. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the judgment below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties stipulated to certain facts before the 
trial judge. They are essentially as follows: 
1. The action is not being pursued as a class action, 
but only on behalf of the named plaintiffs, Quayle Cannon, Jr, 
and Sheldon Brewster (R. 73). 
2. Both Mr. Brewster and Mr. Cannon claimed benefits 
under the retin,ment act. and those benefits were denieo by the 
defendants (R. 73-74). 
3. The clairas of the plaintiffs are for legislative 
service rendered prior to 1961. Both plaintiffs served in the 
legislature> for at least four years. Mr. Cannon served from 1941 
to 1945 (2 sessions of 2 years each). Mr. Brewster served froo 
1937 through 1943 and from 1957 through 1960 (4 sessions of 2 
years each) (R. 74). 
4. Other former legislators are receiving a legis-
lative pension for service in the legislature prior to the 1961. 
The reason that such individuals are receiving legislative ~~ 
sions for years of service prior to 1961 is that they were 
employed by the statP. on July l 1961 and had rendered service to 
the state for a 90-day period between June 30 1960 and July L 
1961. The plaintiffs were not given pensions because they faiied 
to meet these two requirements (R. 74). 
5. The plaintiffs were refused benefits on the ground 
that formal service credit is a prerequisite to eligibility under 
-2-
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tl on 49-10-36 and that the plaintiffs did not have that formal sec 
credit for having served in the legislature prior to 1961 (R. 74). 
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POINT ONE 
Background 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
FORMER LEGISLATORS WHO HAVE SERVED FOUR 
OR MORE YEARS IN THE UTAH LEGISLATURE 
UPON REACHING THE AGE OF 65 ARE ENTITLED 
TO RECEIVE A LEGISLATIVE PENSION WITHOUT 
REGARD TO THE FORMAL CONCEPTS OF SERVICE 
CREDIT. 
In 1971 the Utah State Retirement Act [1971 Act] was 
enactec'l. Laws of Utah, 1971 Session Chapter 111. It repealed 
the Utah Public Employees' Retirement Act which provided retire· 
ment, disability and death benefits to many of the officers and 
employees of the state. counties, cities, and other political 
subdivisions. See Laws of Utah, 1961 Session, Chapter 100, 
Section 2. The 1971 Act also (1) createc'l a Governor's and 
Legislative Service Pension Division, (2) provided that the 
funding of benefits for the governor's and legislative pensions 
would come from annual appropriations from the general fund (as 
opposed to individual trust accounts from contributions) and (3) 
allowed a legislative pension to any member who has credit for 
four or more years of service as a legislator in the Utah 
legislature in an amount of only $10.00 per month for each ~ar 
of service as a member of the legislature. Laws of Utah, 1971 
Session, Chapter 111, Section 6. 
A 1975 amendment to the 1971 Act (1) added an ope~ 
ended funding provision authorizing the state director of finance 
-4-
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1 W •actuarially fund the cost of the pensions and benefits autho-
rized and being paid" through the governor's and legislators 
pension division "during the forthcoming year", and (2) added a 
~spital and medical payment plan for members of the legislature, 
I and retired and inactive members with four or more years of 
legislative service credit. Laws of Utah, 1975 Session. Chapter 
146, Section 6. 
In summary the 1971 Act created a separate "governor's 
anrl legislative service pension division of the Utah State en-
ploymen t sys tern . with the funding of benefits • 
. being 
underwritten by annual appropriations from the general fund." 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-36 (Supp. 1979). The le9islative service 
pension is separate from and in addition to normal employee 
retirement benefits. Unlike the normal retirement benefits which 
ue funded by employee/employer contributions to individual trust 
~counts (Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-20 and 49-10-21 (1970 and Supp. 
1979)), the legislative pension is funded by "annual appropri-
ations from the general fund." 
Defendants' Argument and Issue 
Defendants' justification for the denial of legislative 
pensions to plaintiffs is founded on the following line of argu-
~ents; (1) the language in section 49-14-36(2) which speaks of 
"credit for four or more years of service as a legislator" refers 
1
1 
to the formal, technical "service credit" defined by section 49-
lO-lG ("current service credit") and section 49-10-17 ("prior 
5
'rv1ce credit"); (2) since plaintiffs' service was rendered 
-5-
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prior to 1961. they had "prior service credit" under the cur 
rent 
1971 Act only to the extent they had "creditable service" under 
the predecessor 1961 Act (see Utah Code Ann.§ 49-10-17(a)(l)); 
and (3) the plaintiffs had no "creditable service" under the 
predecessor Act for the pre-1961 service in the legislature 
because former section 49-1-49 of the 1961 Act allowed credit for 
service rendered prior to 1961 only if an employee were eng~~ 
in covered employment as of July 1, 1961, and neither plaintiff 
was so employed as of July 1 1961. See Laws of Utah 1961 
Session, Chapter 100, Section 18 ( 1) [hereafter and heretofore 
"1961 Act" l. 
The first leg of defendants'justification argument and 
the controlling issue in this case, is whether the language of 
section 39-·10-36 referring to "credit for four or more years of 
service" means formal, technical "service credit" as defined in 
sections 49-10-16 and 49-10-17. This is purely a question of 
statutory construction, and it is ultimately the Court's province 
and duty to construe laws enacted by the legislature. 
Broad Construction Needed 
In construing a statute the fundamental judicial con-
cern is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Johnson v. 
State Tax Comr.iission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (1966). 
This includes judicial deference to the legislative intent 
regarding the breadth of statutory construction. The legislature 
has expressed a general intent that statutory provisions "are to 
be liberally cons trued with a view to e £feet the obi" ts vf the 
_J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
statutes and to promote justice." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 
(197 8) • Moreover the legislature has expressed its specific 
intent with regard to construction of the 1971 Act: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
legislature that this act be liberally con-
strued so that the benefits and protections 
as herein provided shall be extended as 
broadly as reasonably possible. 
1 Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-7 ( 1970). Plaintiffs urge the Court to 
res~ct these legislative expressions of intent by construing 
~ction 49-10-36 so that the benefits of the legislative pension 
"shall be extended as broadly as reasonably possible." 
It is "the well-established rule that statutes will not 
be severed and considered piecemeal, but must be given effect in 
their entirety whenever possible." Peay v. Board of Education, 
14 Utah 2d 63 377 P.2d 490, 492 (1962). And "where there is 
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of terms, they should be 
analyzed in the light of the total context" of the statute. 
Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1974). The legislative 
~nsion provisions, therefore, must be analyzed in light of the 
total 1971 Act. 
It is equally well settled that the plain and literal 
~~ing of a statute is the foundational intrinsic evidence of 
legislative intent: 
[A] statute should not be •.. applied other 
than in accordance with its literal wording 
unless it is so unclear or confused as to be 
wholly beyond reason or inoperable, or ~t 
contravenes some basic constitutional right. 
~lt Lake City 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (1967). 
tlhen the construction involves "technical words and phrases" 
-7 -
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which "are def inea by statute, [they] are to be construed 
according to such P'~culiar and appropriate meaning or defi-
nition." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1978). 
"Service Credit" 
Plaintiffs contend that according to the plain a~ 
literal terms of the statute the technical term of "service 
credit" cannot apply to section 49-10-36. The 1971 Act diffe~ 
entiates between "service credit," which is required of regular 
employees covered under the Act, and "credit for years of 
service" as applied to legislators. 
Sections 49-·10-16 and 49-10-17 of the 1971 Act define 
"service cre<iit" in terms of "service" and "covered service". 
Section 49-10-6(16) defines "service" and "covered 
service" as "service rendered to an employer for compensation 
which is included in computations relating to membership status 
or benefit rights under this act." (Emphasis added.) Also, 
"years of service" and "service years" are defined by section 4~ 
10-6 (19) as designated periods "during which an employee per-
formed services for an employer or employers." (Emphasis added.I 
It is more than noteworthy that the statutory defi-
nitions of "service " "covered service," "years of service " and 
"service years" all refer only to services performec1 to or for an 
"employer". Section 49-10-6 ( 5) defines an "employer" as "any 
department, educational institution or political subdivision for 
which any employee or member per[orms services subject to the 
provisions of this act." 
-8-
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I 
~ 
The state legislature does not come within the defi-
nition of "department" under section 49-10-6(2), or the defi-
nition of "educational institution" under section 49-10-6 ( 3), or 
the definition of "political subdivision'' under section 49-10-
6(4). Consequently the term "employer" does not include the 
state legislature. 
"Em pl oye •'" 
The fact that the stuatuory definition of "employer" 
does not include the state legislature was recognized by the 
legislature in its enactment of the 1971 Act. That is why the 
legislature included a twofold definition of "employee" under 
section 49-10-6 ( 6). This section first defines "employees" as 
those engaged in a "term of employement for an employer". 
(~phasis added.) Secondly, this section expands the definition 
~"employee" to include "an officer, elective or appointive." 
~is second definition specifically allows members of the Utah 
l~islature to exclude themselves from coverage under the 1971 
Act. Thus, there can be no question that they are covered as 
"off ice rs" uncle r the second definition. Hence, the very 
existence of the second definition conclusively shows that 
rne~bers of the Utah legislature are not covered by the first 
de:1nition which refers to ''employer" or "employers". (If the 
l~islature were an "employer" there would be no need for an 
additional definition of "employee" in this section.) 
l - 9 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Since the legislature is not considered an "employer" 
the technical "service credit" requirements cannot be applicable 
to legislators. According to the literal wording of the statute 
legislators cannot perform "service" "covered service" "years 
of service", or "service years", in the statutory technical 
sense, because they do not work for an "employer". Being incap-
able of rendering "service" or "covered service" as defined in 
the 1971 Act, legislators therefore cannot acquire any current~ 
prior "service credit". Consequently, if "service credit" isa 
prerequisite to legislative pension benefits under section 49-10· 
36, no legislator would ever be eligible to receive a legislative 
pension. Surely the legislature could not have intended this 
absurd result when it enacted the 1971 Act. 
If the legislature had meant to require four or more 
years of ''service credit", it could easily and clearly have used 
such words. That it was capable of doing so is clearly mani-
fested by a concluding paragraph of the same section that created 
the legislative pension. It is stated that retired members of 
the legislature may participate in a hospital and medical plan 
developed by the state retirement office if they have "four or 
more years of legislative service credit". Utah Code Ann. § 49· 
10-36(3)(para. 4)(Supp.1979) (Emphasis added). Because similar 
language was not used concerning the monthly legislative pension, 
the legislature evidenced its intent that formal "service credit" 
not be required for legislative pensions. 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In summary defendants' theory that "credit for four or 
~ore years of service" should be construed to mean four or more 
technical "service years" of "service credit" is obviously not 
supported by the literal wording of the statute. The acceptance 
of ac~endants' argument would create internal contradictions in 
1 the plain wording of the 1971 Act. This inconsistency would not 
~ve been the intent of the legislature which unequivocally 
1 intended to provide benefits for former legislators in as broad a 
scope as r~asonably possible. 
Plaintiffs suggest instead that "credit for four or 
more years of service" shoul<'I be construed to mean that credit 
will be granted i:or all past legislative service and that if a 
~mer legislator has four or more years legislative service, at 
age 65 he is eligible for a pension of $10.00 per month for each 
year of legislative service. 'I'his construction avoids the judi-
cial creation of internal contradiction in the statute and 
exte~cls bene: its to former legislators "as broadly as reasonably 
possible." Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-7 ( 1970). 
Plaintiffs' contruction of the statute is not only 
required by a logical literal, straightforward reading of the 
statute itself, but it also guarantees a reasonable.- practicable, 
~iform application of statutory benefits. Since the number of 
former legislators over age 65 is necessarily limited, and 
~cause the legislative pension is funded almost exclusively by 
special appropriation from the general fund, and because the 
~0 ns1on itself is nominal in amount, this construction of the 
-11-
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statute would not result in uncontrollable, unlimited pension 
claims or jeopardize the public fisc. 
No Intent to Discriminate Unjustly 
Plaintiffs' construction is also required in order~ 
avoid the unjust and cliscriminatory consequences that flow from 
defendants' interpretation of the statute. Assuming arguendo 
that the technical "service credit" requirements apply to le~is-
lative pensions, the statute would unjustly discriminate between 1 
pre-1961 legislators who Here employed under "covered services" 
of the 1961 Act as of July 1, 1961 ana pre-1961 legislators w~ 
were not. Former section 49-1-49 of the 1961 Act allowed credit 
for pre-1961 service only if the employee were employed by a 
covered employer as of July 1 1961. Thus, if a pre-1961 
legislator were in any way a covered employee -- legislative or 
non-legislative as of July 1 1961 ana hacl rendered at least 
90 days service between June 30, 1960, and July 1 1961, all his 
former legislative service could he claimed as prior service 
credit under the 1961 Act. His prior legislative service could 
be bootstrapped to his then current employement even if totally 
unrelatea to legislative service. In contrast, a pre-1961 legis-
la tor who happened to be in private employment not covered by thi 
1961 Act as of July 1, 1961 could not acquire any credit for his 
' 
prior years of legislative service. I 
In short, under defendants' theory, credit for pre-19 61 j 
::: i ::::: :: :::: :::e:e:: n::c :~: i:r ':::::c::m:::::: ~ :::::::,::, I 
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former legislator happened to be covered under the 1961 Act in 
~me capacity as of July l 1961. A legislature which enacted a 
special provision to benefit "as broadly as reasonably possible" 
its former members cannot have intended an unequal. 0 iscrimi-
1 natory result based on the unsubstantial clistinction of place of 
employment as of July 1, 1961. 
An intent to discriminate unjustly between different 
cases of the same kind or to produce incongruous results is not 
, tobc= ascribeCl to the legislature. Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 
254, 390 P.2d 915 916 (1964). Kellum v. Johnson 237 Miss. 580, 
115 So. 2d 147 (1959). And where the statute is anbiguous, 
"courts will strive to avoid an interpretation imputing a design 
to distinciuish between cases upon a course of reasoning too 
unsubstantial and too finely drawn for regulation of human 
action, or producing arbitrary or incongruous results, or an 
anomalous, capricious, or senseless distinction or discrimi-
nation or an unequal opera ti on generally." 7 3 Am. Jur. 2d 
Statutes § 261 ( 1974). 
This unjust and unreasonable dichotomy produced by 
deiendants' interpretation exists not only in theory but in the 
actual practice of the Utah State Retirement Board. Defendants 
stipulatea that former legislators, some of whom served concur-
rently with plaintiffs, and all of whom served prior to 1961, 
ha 11 e received and arc now receiving legislative pension benefits 
~rsuant to section 49-10-36, merely because they were employed 
~an employer covereCl by the 1961 Act as of July 1, 1961. This 
stipulation alone is evidence that defendants' interpretation of 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the statute is erroneous in that it ascribes to the legisl t 
a ure 
an intent to discrimin0te on the basis of an unsubstantial clis-
tinction. 
Other Plans Not Affected 
--------
Deiendants sug']est incorrectly that the trial court's 
reason in'] will apply with equal force to all public employees. 
Such is not the case. Section 49-10-36 provides retirement 
benefits for the elected officials -- legislators and governors. 
For all other public employees (those whose existence in sta~ 
government aoes not depend upon the will of the electorate), the 
concepts of service credit come in to play, as demons tratecl by the 
following provisions: 
1. Section 49-10-2 4 covers the options of an employee 
who ceases to be employed in "covered services" for an employer 
for reasons other than retirement, permanent or temporary dis-
ability or death. 
2. Section 49-10-31 specifies the requirements for a 
service retirement which depend upon age and the number of years 
of "service", which is service rendered to an employer for com-
pensation. Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(1G)(Supp. 1979). The 
various plans for service retirement provide pensions based upon 
"prior service" and "current service", which again relate to 
services provided to employers. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-32, 
16, 17, 6(16) (1970 & Supp. 1979). 
Hence, these general benefit sections apply expressly 
tc all "employees" of "employers", thus including the workers o: 
th(' following: 
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1. Any "department" which means any 
"department, office, board, commission, 
instrumentality or other agency of the state 
of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(5), (2) 
(1970). 
2. Any "educational institution" which means 
a "political subdivision or instrumentality 
of the state or of a political subdivision . 
. . primarily engaged in educational 
activities or the administration or servicing 
thereof . Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-
6(5), ( 3) (1970). 
3. Any "political subdivision" which 
includes "educational institutions, cities, 
towns, counties, leagues or associations 
thereof or associations of the Utah public 
employees ... mos~uito abatement districts, 
sewer or water districts, water associations 
and companies, libraries, and any consoli-
dation . Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-6(5), 
(4) (1970 & Supp. 1979). 
The employees of such entities would not be affected in any way 
by the court's ruling in this case. By the plain meaning of the 
statute the t<?chnical concepts involving "service credit" apply 
to such employees. 
Moreover the ruling has no apparent effect upon the 
other retirement systems referred to by the defendants. 
1. The Utah Public Safety Retirement Act (Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 49-11-1 et seq.) provides retirement benefits for all 
~ployees engaged full time in public safety work. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 49-11-1 (1970). An employee in public safety work 
qualifies for a service retirement if he meets certain criteria, 
which relate to the employee's age and years of "service". Utah 
Code Ann.§ 49-11-34 (1970). "Service" is defined to mean 
"public safety service" rendered to an "employer" for compensa-
t1on. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-8 ( 15) ( 1970). "Public safety 
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s~rvice" means service relating to hazardous duty, including 
duties perforr.ted by "municipal policerien, county sheriffs a11 ct 
deputies, state highway pa trolr.ten, law enforcement officers in 
the public safety departr.ient" and the like. Utah Coile Ann. § 49_ 
11-8(14) (1970). An ''employer" is "any department or divisiono; 1 
the state or political subdivision for which any employee or 
member performs services subject to this act." Utah Coile Ann. 1 
49-11-8 ( 5) ( 1970). Clearly, there is no question that public 
service employees can perform the covered "service" necessary lor: 
their retirement benefits. There is nothing that prevents appli-
cation of the concepts of "service credit" found in sections 49-
11-18 through 49-11-20. 
2, The Utah Firemen's Retirer.ient Act (Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 49-6a-l et seq.) is similarly not affected by the court's 
ruling. A fireman or volunteer fireman qualifies for the 
retirement benefits of this Act if he has attained the requisite 
age ana accur.iulated the specifie<i years of "service". Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-6a-27 (1970). "Service" is defined to mean "fireman 
service" renderer] an ''employer" for compensation. Utah Code Ann, 
§ 49-6a-4(11) (1970). "Fireman service'' r.1eans service rendered 
to a regularly constituted fire department. Utah Code Ann.§ 49· 
6a-4(10) (1970). An "employer" is "any regularly constituted 
fire department for which any employee or member performs 
services subject to this act." Utah Corie Ann. § 49-6a-4(5) 
(1970). Again there is not question that a fireman is capable 
of performing "service" for which he accumulates crerlit toward 
retirement b~nefits. . a·t" (Utah Ca~ The concepts of "service ere 1 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ann.§§ 49-6a-11. -12 (1970)) will apply to him, unaffected by 
the court's rulin<J. 
3. The Utah Judges' Retirement Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 
49-7a-l et seq.) is constructed in essentially the same manner. 
A j~ge qualifies for a service retirement at age 70 or 65 if he 
~she has at least 6 or 10 years of "service" respectively. 
utah Co<ie Ann. § 49-7a-25 ( 1970). "Service" in this Act is 
definP.d as "service rendered to the employer for compensation 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-7a-7(9) (1970). The word "employer" 
means the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 49-7a-7(2) (1970). 
once again it is clear that the covered employee, in this case a 
J~ge, can perform the "service" for which he or she accumulates 
cr~dit toward retirement benefits, and the concepts of "service 
credit" (Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-7a-12 to -14 (1970)) apply. The 
ruling in this case will have no effect upon these qualifi-
cations. 
In the case of jud<Jes (section 49-7a-26), firemen 
(~ction 49-6a-28), public service employees (section 49-11-35), 
and employees of "employers" under the Utah State Retirement Act 
(section 49-10-32), the retirement allowance for a service 
~tirement is a function of a final average monthly salary and 
the number of years of service credit. In the case of a state 
legislator who is covered by a special division under provisions 
dissimilar to those above, the pension provided is $10. 00 per 
~n~ of service as a member of the legislature. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 49-10-36(2) (Supp. 1979). No mention is made of "service 
cr.,rli t". Nor shoulil the typical pattern of final average monthly 
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salary times the years of service credit be expected in the 
of a legislator, who is elected for a relatively short term, 
whose "salary" does not progress as it does for a career 
employee, and whom the state cannot entice to stay in his 
"position" for future credit years by the promise of a large 
retirement allowance. 
case 
The defendants' prophecy of financial doom for the many 
1 
retirement systems operated by the state is clearly unfounded. 
The holcling in the case is limited to legislators. The monthly 
allowance is very small. The nunber of: former legislators having 
served four or more years, and the number of years that they have 1 
serve<l is not difficult to determine thereby creating no dif-
ficulty in fund administration. It is believed that the number 
of living, former legislators who qualify for a legislative 
pension is quite small. The public fisc is not endangered. 
I 
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I I 
POINT II: DOCTRINES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT INVOLVr:: 
EXTRANEOUS MATTERS HAVE NO APPLICATION WHI::RE THE 
MEANING OF THI:: STATUTE UNDI::R CONSIDERATION IS 
NOT AMBIGUOUS. 
The defendants contend that the Court should give some 
consideration to the fact that the r::xecutive Director of the Utah 
state Retirement Board decided in 1973 that the plaintiffs are 
not entitled to a legislative pension because they do not have 
enough "service crenit" to qualify. The claim is that the 
legislature has acquiesced in this administrative construction of 
the law by failing to amena the language of the legislator's 
~nsion 10gislation. These arguments should fail to effect the 
court's contrary construction for several reasons. 
First it is not clear at all from defendants' brief 
(p. 11) what the terms were of the proposed amenda tory 
legislation governing pensions for leg isl a tors. Defendants 
desire the Court to take judicial notice of two bills and one 
"bill" that was never introduced without providing complete 
specifications of their terms. From the limited exposition on 
these bills, it would appear that their purpose was to clarify 
th~ existing law rather than to change its intended meaning. 
Mternpting to clarify an unambiguous statute for the benefit of 
m intransiqent administrator so as to say "Yes, we really mean 
it" does not express a message other than that the statute means 
exactly what it says. 
I Second, there is no need to revert to an administrative 
l
construct1on because the statute speaks unambiguously for itself· 
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Indeed giving any weight to an administrative hunch as to the 
meaning of an unambi<Juous statute is not proper. An administra-
tive construction can never go against the plain meaning of the 
statute. E.C. Olsen Co. v. Stat<? Tax Conmission 109 Utah 5GJ, 
168 P.2d 324, 332, (1946). Where a statute is not uncertain in 
its meaning there is no need to consider an administrative 
construction, even if it is a correct interpretation. Lockhead 
-
Aircraft Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 566 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
1977). 
In other words, an error in the construction of a 
statute by an administrator will not bind a court to his 
erroneous view. Lewis v. Utah State Tax Commission, 118 Utah?: 
218 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1950) (members of commission erroneously 
stated exemption applied): Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467, 470-71 (1944) (Commission 
erroneously concluded "name bands" not covered by unemployment 
compensation). 
A case of great importance in this regard is McPhie v 
Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 153 (Utah 1977), where this Cou 
held that the Industrial Commission erroneously denied certain 
lifetime benefits to an injured workman based upon its improper 
construction of the pertinent sections of the compensation 
statutes. The Court reco<Jnizec] its "duty" to correct a miscon· 
struction or misapplication of a statute by administrators. ~ 
P. 2d at 155. The Court also recognized a rule of construction 
applicable to workers' compensation benefit statutes: 
A further equally recognized rule of 
construction resolves any doubt respecting 
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the right of compensation in favor of the 
injured employee or his dependents, as the 
case may be, and the compensation statutes 
should be liberally construed in favor of 
recovery. 
l67 p.2d at 155 (Emphasis added). The Court found that the 
~mmission failed to properly consider this rule of construction. 
The matter was remanded for the purpose of making the appropriate 
award. 
In the case of Mr. Cannon and Mr. Brewster, the Court 
should follow the same course of reasoning. The legislature 
, created a benefit statute for the protection of the aged and 
infirm, not unlike the protection provided for injured workers, 
anil in so doing expressly declared its policy that; 
This act be liberally construed so that the 
benefits and protections as herein provided 
shall be extended as broadly as reasonably 
possible. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-7 (1970). (Emphasis added). It is this 
~licy that the Retirement Board failed to recognize, and the 
trial court correctly remedied the error. 
A case of similar import is Utah Hotel Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24 151 P.2d 467 (1944), where 
~e Court found that the "so-called regulation" under consider-
at1on was nothing more than an "initial guess" as to what the 
statute means. Accorcling to the Court: 
"Thus although as a practical or procedural 
matter an administrative agency must venture 
a decision upon such a question of law, such 
questions are always open for independent 
judgment of an appropriate court acting 
iudicially * * *. And a binding decision on 
a simple iudicial question, such as a 
question of statutory construction, may only 
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be made by an appropriate court acting 
judicially." 
151 P.2d at 470. The Court further stated that it would not 
allow an erroneous construction to stand because its effect would 
be to amend the statute 151 P.2d at 472. 
Third it makes no difference how long a legislature 
may be said to have acquiesced in an administrative construction 
if such construction is not in conformity with the plain meaning ' 
of the statute. For example, in Union Pacific R.R. v. State Tax 
Com1.1ission. 19 Utah 2d 92 426 P.2d 231 (1967), it appeared that 
for 22 years the Commission had interpreted a statute so as to 
exempt railroads from paying a sales and use tax on its fuel o!l,, 
The Court rc~i:used to consider the administrative construction anc 
the "acquiescence" of the legislature because it found no ambi-
guity in the statute involved. According to the Court: 
[N]o matter how long the usage has been 
established or how general the acquiesence 
in the customary construction, it will not be 
permitted to override the plain meaning of a 
statute 
4 2 6 P . 2d at 2 3 3. 
To the same effect is Alexander v. Bennett 5 Utah 2d 1 
163, 298 P.2d 823 (J.956), where from 1939 to 1956 there had been 
Attorney General opinions which had been followed by the Depart-
ment of Registration to the effect that naturopathic physicians 
could use drugs and perform minor surgery. The Court refused to 
consider these opinions, stating that the interpretations have 
not been long acquiescecl in and that the statutes in guest1onare, 
not ambiguous. 
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tive pt·nsion statute is unambiguous in requiring that the 
plaintiffs receive a pension and that it is not proper to con-
sirler the allcc:ied construction placed upon the statute by the 
~rninistrator for only six years. If any doubt in meaning is 
~rceived, we submit that such doubt should be resolved in favor 
of the plaintiffs to effect the policy of the legislature that 
the act be liberally construed so that bene!:its be extended as 
broadly as reasonably possible. 
EI 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to affirm the court below in 
ruling that the phrase "credit for four or more years of service 
in the l<"gislature" contemplates the awardin') of credit for all 
past legislative service and provides a legislative pension for 
all former legislators havin<J the requisite "four or more years 
of service." Plaintiffs submit that defendants' attempt to 
equate "credit for four or more years of service" with the 
technical terms of "service credit" and "service years" is 
unwarranb"d by th<> plain and literal wording of the statute and 
produces internal contradictions within the statutory scheme. 
Moreoever defendants' interpretation inevitably leads to un-
justly ciiscriminatory and incongruous results, as evidenced by 
the stipulated current practices of defendants. 
The unequivocal legislative intent was to establish a 
special "governor's and legislative service pension division of 
the Utah State employment system . underwritten by annual 
appropriations from the general fund." Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-
36. Furthermore, the l<:>g islature clearly intended that the 1911 
Act "be liberally construed so that the benefits and protections 
[therein] provided shall be extended as broadly as reasonably 
possible." Id. § 49-10-7. Extending the legislative pension 
bene:::its to all former legislators regardless of their place of 
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employment on July l 1961 · is, without doubt, reasonably possi-
blC i both financially and administratively. 
DATED this 31sr Clay of October. 1979. 
~CQ"uJ. 
DAVID A. WESTERBY, ES~ 
Jl.J1211J~ 
RICHARD R. NESLEN, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
330 South Thirr'l East 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3680 
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